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Introduction
Many high technology products are based on technological standards that require the use of multiple essential patents owned by different IP holders. By definition an essential patent is strictly necessary for the standard, either because it is legally impossible or prohibitively expensive to do without it.
1 Thus, if a downstream firm wants to produce goods that are based on the standard it requires access to each of the essential patents. All the patents are perfect complements. Therefore each of the upstream IP holders has monopoly power over the downstream market. This "patent thicket" (Shapiro, 2001) gives rise to a complements problem: each patent holder does not internalize the negative external effect on the revenues of the other patent holders when setting his royalties, so the sum of all royalties will be inefficiently high. In addition, there is a vertical double marginalization problem if firms on the downstream market have market power. These externalities affect not only the prices charged downstream, they also affect the incentives to enter the downstream market with new product varieties and to develop new technology that improves the quality of the standard.
Firms have used different strategies to deal with these externalities. Many standard setting organisations require their members to charge "reasonable and non-discriminatory" (RAND) royalties. 2 There seems to be a consensus that RAND commitments prevent outright refusal to license and exclusive licensing, but any additional constraints implied by RAND, in particular concerning royalties, are controversial. As Swanson and Baumol (2005) point out:
"It is widely acknowledged that, in fact, there are no generally agreed tests to determine whether a particular license does or does not satisfy a RAND commitment". Thus, a reference to RAND hardly restricts the pricing policies of patent holders.
In some industries patent holders horizontally integrated, either by merging or by forming a patent pool that licenses all patents as a package at a single royalty. Patent pools have been perceived as a device for collusion by anti-trust authorities for many decades. This perception has changed within the last decade when the U.S. Department of Justice approved the MPEG-2 patent pool in 1997 and two DVD patent pools shortly thereafter. However, the 1 A patent is "legally essential" for a standard if the standard cannot be implemented without infringing the patent. It is "commercially essential" if it is prohibitively expensive to implement the standard without the patent, even if this is technologically feasible. See Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2008, p. 9) . In reality it is not always obvious whether a patent is essential or not. Patent holders have a strong incentive to overstate the importance of their IP rights. Furthermore, it is often unclear whether a patent will survive if it is challenged in court. For a more detailed discussion of these problems see Lemley and Shapiro (2007) and Dewatripont and Legros (2008) . In this paper we do not consider these problems and assume that it is common knowledge which patents are in fact essential. 2 In Europe, most SSOs require royalties to be "fair" in addition.
patent pool has to consist only of "blocking" patents, i.e. that all patents are perfect complements that are essential to the standard.
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In other industries firms vertically integrated. For example, in the mobile phone industry some firms such as Nokia or Sony Ericson not only own essential patents to the WCDMA standard, they also produce handsets on the downstream market. However, on the same market there are also firms that own essential patents without producing handsets (e.g.
Qualcomm), and firms who produce handsets but do not own essential patents (e.g.
Panasonic)
. Similarly, most of the DVD patent holders (Phillips, Sony, Toshiba, etc.) also produce DVD players and DVDs.
In this paper we discuss the effects of different market structures on upstream royalties, downstream prices, entry decisions and incentives to innovate. Our model of the downstream market is very general and allows for all kinds of downstream market interaction (competition in prices, quantities, product differentiation, advertising, etc.) as long as a weak regularity condition is satisfied. As a base line we consider a market structure in which upstream and downstream firms are non-integrated and where linear royalties have to be used upstream. Then we ask how the market outcome changes if some (or all) upstream firms vertically integrate with some downstream firms. It turns out that even though vertical integration partially solves the vertical double mark-up problem it may result in higher royalties and less production on the downstream market than non-integration. This is due to the fact that a vertically integrated firm has an incentive to raise its royalty rate in order to raise its rivals' cost. In contrast, horizontal integration of upstream firms (either by merging or by forming a patent pool) is always beneficial. Furthermore, if the number of downstream firms is sufficiently large, horizontal integration outperforms vertical integration.
We also consider the use of two-part tariffs. It is well known that two-part tariffs can be used to solve the double mark-up problem in a vertical relationship of two firms that both have market power. We show that it can also be used to solve the complements problem (together with the double mark-up problem) under all market structures. This is particularly simple if all upstream firms are horizontally integrated. If firms are non-integrated there exists a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium in which all upstream firms charge two-part tariffs that solve the complements and the double mark-up problem. Lerner (2008) and Gilbert (2002) for more on the history of patent pools and the shift of US policy.
efficiency can be achieved in an asymmetric equilibrium with the awkward property that one firm monopolizes the downstream market but makes zero profits, while all the other vertically integrated firms do not produce downstream but extract all the monopoly profits from the producing firm with their fixed fees. Thus, it seems far less likely that firms manage to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium under vertical integration than under horizontal integration.
Perhaps even more important than the effects of market structure on prices are the effects on entry and innovation. We show that vertically integrated firms have an incentive to discriminate against entrants on the downstream market in order to raise their rival's cost which is not the case for a horizontally integrated or a non-integrated upstream firm. Even if a firm enters with an entirely new product that requires the standard but does not compete against the other goods on the downstream market, a horizontally integrated firm will charge lower royalties and induce more entry than vertically integrated and non-integrated firms because the latter firms cannot coordinate their royalties upstream.
Finally we consider the incentives of an upstream firm to innovate and invest in an improvement of the standard. This improvement may reduce downstream production costs, it may make the products based on the standard more valuable to consumers, or it may open the door to new applications. No matter what the benefits of the innovation are, the incentives to innovate are smaller the more firms there are on the upstream market. The reason is that the innovator requires access to all the other patents in the standard. The more IP holders there are, the smaller are the profits that can be generated with any given innovation and the more reluctant the incumbent IP holders are to include an additional essential patent in the standard.
Thus, horizontal integration on the upstream market is an important instrument to stimulate innovation. This is an additional argument in favor of the current shift in US competition policy to permit patent pools for complementary patents.
Our paper is closely related to the growing literature on patent pools and complementary patents. Shapiro (2001) discusses the case of patents that are perfect complements and argues that patent pools and cross licensing agreements can be a solution to the complements problem. Lerner and Tirole (2004) argue that it is often not obvious whether patents are complements or substitutes. They show that patent pools that are based on complementary patents are welfare increasing, while patents that include substitutes reduce competition and welfare. Furthermore, if patents are complements, patent pools will allow for independent licensing, while patent pools that include substitutes will not do so. This is confirmed empirically by Lerner, Stojwas and Tirole (2006) . They propose independent licensing as a screening device to be used by anti-trust authorities to distinguish between welfare increasing and welfare reducing patent pools. Aoki and Nagaoka (2004) consider the free rider problem that arises in the process of the formation of a patent pool. Each upstream firm benefits if other firms join the pool and reduce their royalties, but it may be profitable for each firm to stay out. None of these papers considers the effects of vertical integration nor do they analyse the effects on entry and innovation.
Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2008) provide an empirical investigation of the different sharing rules employed in modern patent pools and the factors that affect the decision of an IP holder to join a patent pool. They find that vertically integrated firms are more likely to join a pool and that IP holders with more valuable patents are less likely to join if the pool shares profits proportional to the number of essential patents.
Layne-Farrar, Padilla and Schmalensee (2006) discuss potential methods for assessing whether licensing terms are "fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory" (FRAND). They argue that patents that make a greater contribution to the value of the standard should be allowed to charge higher royalties. Gilbert and Katz (2007) analyze different sharing rules in patent pools and their impact on the incentives to develop new technology. In our model, all upstream firms are symmetric, so the sharing rule is trivially the equal split.
Our paper is also related to the literature on raising rivals' costs strategies by vertically integrated firms. Sheffman (1983, 1987 ) consider a dominant firm that can affect marginal and average costs of a competitive fringe. They show that the dominant firm will raise its rivals' cost in order to either foreclose the market or to induce competitors to raise their prices and to relax competition. Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990) The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up a very general model of a vertically structured industry in which all upstream goods are perfect complements. Section 3 restricts attention to linear royalties and compares a market structure where all firms are non-integrated to market structures where some firms are vertically or horizontally integrated. Section 4 allows for two-part tariffs. In Section 5 we discuss the effect of different market structures on entry on the same or another (unrelated) downstream market.
In Section 6 we consider the incentives of upstream firms to innovate. Section 7 concludes and discusses the application of the model to other industries with complementary inputs such as rail or electricity networks.
The Model
Consider an industry with an upstream and a downstream market. Example 1 in the appendix shows that Assumption 1 is satisfied in a Cournot model with n firms under a mild condition on the demand function. The assumption that the equilibrium production level of each firm is a decreasing function of its own marginal cost, and that total production decreases as well is very natural and holds much more generally. Dixit (1986) shows that it is satisfied in duopoly models of price and quantity competition with very general demand functions, and in oligopoly models with homogenous goods for both Bertrand and Cournot competition.
If there are multiple equilibria in the downstream market game a comparative static analysis is possible only with respect to the set of equilibria. Some of our results continue to hold in this case, but the analysis is messy and not insightful. Therefore, we restrict attention to the case of a unique downstream equilibrium.
We do not derive downstream demand from the preferences of rational consumers and we do not model oligopolistic interaction explicitly because we want to keep the downstream market as general as possible. Therefore, we cannot make any explicit welfare statements. As a point of reference we will compare the market outcome under different market structures to the outcome that would obtain if there were no contracting problems and firms could solve the complements and the double mark-up problem perfectly, i.e. if all upstream and all downstream firms could agree on a set of royalties that maximize total industry profits. This is called the "full integration outcome". It will turn out that in all the cases we consider the market outcome involves higher royalties and lower total quantities than this full integration benchmark. Almost all models of oligopoly imply that in this case an increase in total quantity Q is associated with an increase of consumer surplus. Therefore, we will often say that an increase of Q "tends to increase" consumer surplus and social welfare. 
Linear Royalties under Different Market Structures
In this section we characterize the royalties that obtain under different market structures. Proof: See Appendix.
In equilibrium each upstream firm maximizes its profits ( , )
uuu u rQ r r − Π = . Because all firms are symmetric they all charge the same royalty rate that is fully characterized by the first order condition
where the superscript NI stands for "Non-integration".
As a reference point, suppose that all upstream and all downstream firms can agree on a set of royalties that maximize total industry profits, but they cannot restrict the actions chosen on the 5 A similar assumption is required in any Cournot game to guarantee existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. See Novshek (1985) and Shapiro (1989 Comparing the objective function (2) of a single upstream firm to total profits (3), we see that each upstream firm does not take into account the impact of its own royalty rate on the profits of all other upstream firms, nor on the profits of all downstream firms nor on consumer surplus.
Proposition 2: In equilibrium royalties are too high as compared to the royalties in the full integration benchmark. By increasing its royalty rate firm u exerts two negative externalities: • by reducing total quantity Q it reduces the profits of the other upstream firms (complements effect) • by raising the total royalty burden it reduces the profits of the downstream firms (double mark-up effect)
Proof: The first order conditions for the maximization of total industry profits require for all
where and the superscript "FI" stands for "Full Integration". Note that for total industry profits only the sum of royalties matters, while the distribution across upstream firms is irrelevant. Therefore, we impose w.l.o.g. . If all upstream firms choose the optimal royalties under full integration total quantity is . Comparing
straightforward to see that the first derivative of each firm's profit function would be strictly positive. Thus, this cannot be an equilibrium. Each firm would have an incentive to increase its royalty until the FOC is satisfied. Hence, .
Q.E.D.
The complements effect has first been observed by Cournot (1838, Chapter 9) . It stems from the fact that the goods produced by the upstream firms are perfect complements that are sold by independent firms. The double mark-up effect is due to the vertical chain of producers that all have market power. Upstream firms have a monopoly on their patents that are essential inputs for downstream firms that also have market power and impose an additional mark-up when they sell to consumers.
Vertical Integration
Suppose Proof: Under vertical integration a firm does not have to pay royalties to its own upstream division. Therefore, if royalties are the same, the marginal costs of each vertically integrated firm are lower than the cost of a non-integrated firm:
By Assumption 1, total equilibrium quantity increases if the marginal cost of one firm decreases. Therefore, Q increases if upstream firms vertically integrate.
Q.E.D. Q
The result suggests that vertical integration is beneficial because it raises total quantity. However, this need not be the case. Corollary 1 assumes that royalty rates are the same under non-integration and vertical integration. This could be the case if prices on the upstream market are regulated by the same price cap that is binding under both market structures. However, if firms are not constrained in their royalties they will choose different royalty rates under different market structures.
What royalties will be chosen under vertical integration? When a vertically integrated firm sets its royalty rate, it internalizes the effect on the profits of its own downstream division. Thus, vertical integration solves the double mark-up problem within each firm.
However, there are still three negative externalities:
1. The well known double mark-up problem across firms remains, because firm i does not take into account the effect of its own royalty i r on firm j 's downstream profit.
2. Furthermore, a vertically integrated firm does not internalize the effect of its royalty rate on the upstream profits of the other firms. Thus, vertical integration does not solve the complements problem.
3. Finally, there is a new externality that does not exist under non-integration nor under horizontal integration. This is the "raising one's rivals' costs" effect: The higher the royalty charged by firm i the higher are the costs of the other firms active on the downstream market, while firm i 's costs are unaffected. This induces firm i to raise its royalties in order to raise its rivals' costs.
Because all of these externalities are negative, royalties in a vertically integrated industry are too high.
Proposition 3: Royalties chosen if all upstream firms are vertically integrated are larger than the royalties in the full integration benchmark.
Proof: See Appendix.
The more interesting question is whether vertical integration is superior to non-integration.
Perhaps surprisingly this is not necessarily the case. Vertically integrated firms may charge higher royalties and induce a less efficient market outcome than non-integrated firms. 
The first two terms correspond to the FOC under non-integration: An increase in v r raises revenues per unit of output, but it reduces the quantity of output. The last two terms reflect the effect of an increase of v r on downstream profits and have no analogue under nonintegration.
Consider the third term first: By increasing its royalty rate v r firm v raises the costs of all downstream firms which increases the market price. However, it also increases the cost of its own downstream division, so profits of the downstream division are reduced. Because firm v internalizes this vertical double mark-up problem it has an incentive to moderate its royalty rate as compared to a non-integrated upstream firm.
However, there is a forth effect that works in the opposite direction: By raising its royalty rate firm v increases the marginal costs of its downstream competitors iv ≠ . Thus, in the downstream continuation equilibrium the quantities chosen by all other firms are reduced while the quantity of firm v goes up, so firm v receives the mark-up, i Pc − , on a larger quantity. Thus, the forth term gives an additional incentive to raise royalties as compared to a non-integrated upstream firm.
This "raising one's rivals' cost effect" implies that each vertically integrated firm has an incentive to raise its royalty rate in order to improve its own market position to the detriment of its rivals. However, there is a prisoners' dilemma. In equilibrium all vertically integrated firms choose the same royalty, nobody has a competitive advantage, and everybody would be better off if all firms could jointly reduce their royalties.
Proposition 4: Vertically integrated firms may choose higher or lower royalties than nonintegrated upstream firms.
In the Appendix we offer two simple examples showing that the net effect can go in both directions.
Even if vertical integration yields higher royalties than non-integration it may still yield a more efficient market outcome because vertically integrated firms are not distorted by the royalties that they pay to themselves. However, for the case of a Cournot model with linear demand Kim (2004, p. 245) shows that if the number of vertically integrated firms is not too large, then vertical integration yields a total quantity that is smaller than the total quantity produced under non-integration. Thus, vertical integration may reduce total output, total industry profit and social welfare.
Horizontal Integration
We now consider the possibility that some upstream firms merge and integrate horizontally.
The integrated firm bundles its IP rights and licenses them at a joint royalty rate on the downstream market.
Proposition 5:
As the number of upstream firms decreases, total equilibrium royalties are reduced and total quantity sold on the downstream market increases.
Proposition 5 shows that -in contrast to the case of vertical integration -a horizontal merger unambiguously reduces royalties and increases total industry profits. Furthermore, it increases the total quantity of production and thus improves efficiency. Hence, horizontal integration is always more profitable and more efficient than non-integration. However, under horizontal integration royalties are still higher than the royalty rate that maximizes total industry profits. Proof: see Appendix.
Two-part Tariffs
So far we assumed that upstream firms are restricted to use linear royalties which is the prevalent case in reality. However, firms could also use two-part tariffs. It is well known that two part-tariffs can be used to solve the double mark-up problem. If firms are horizontally integrated or form a patent pool it is very simple (and a dominant strategy) to implement the full integration outcome: set the linear royalty such that downstream firms are induced to charge the monopoly price and choose the fixed fee such that it extracts all downstream profits.
In this section we show that if firms are not horizontally integrated they can still use two-part tariffs to solve the complements problem and to implement the fully integrated outcome. However, in contrast to the case of horizontal integration this requires coordination among the IP holders. We will show that this can be difficult and is more likely to happen when firms are non-integrated than when they are vertically integrated. 
FI r
Note that if upstream firms can also use discriminatory royalties the equilibrium breaks down. In this case a deviating upstream firm can raise its fixed fee for 1 n − downstream firms to infinity, so that only one downstream firm survives and serves the downstream market as a monopolist. If the deviating upstream firm raises its fixed fee for this remaining downstream firm so that it extracts all the monopolist's profits, the deviation is profitable. Note further that there are other symmetric pure strategy equilibria as well. For example, it is always an equilibrium that all upstream firms charge fixed and/or linear royalties that are so high that no downstream firm wants to license. With vertical integration and sufficiently many upstream firms the symmetric equilibrium breaks down. The reason is that a vertically integrated firm de facto discriminates in favour of its own downstream division even if it charges all firms the same royalties. This is because the downstream division of a vertically integrated firm is not affected by the royalty charged by its own company. Thus, a vertically integrated firm could raise its fixed and/or linear royalty to a prohibitive level and thus exclude all other firms from the downstream market. If the number of VI firms is sufficiently large, so that the share of total profits accruing to each firm in a symmetric equilibrium is sufficiently small, such a deviation becomes profitable. In this case a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium that implements the full integration outcome fails to exist which makes the coordination problem much more difficult. To be sure, there are asymmetric pure strategy equilibria that implement the monopoly outcome, but these equilibria are asymmetric and awkward: One firm monopolizes the downstream market, but this firm makes zero profits and all the rents go to the upstream firms that are not active downstream. Because nobody wants to be the zero profit monopolist, it seems very difficult to coordinate on such an equilibrium.
To summarize: Two part-tariffs can be used to increase total industry profit. This tends to increase social welfare because total quantity increases. For a horizontally integrated firm (or a patent pool) it is a dominant strategy to set royalties that implement the full integration outcome. With non-integrated firms there exists a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium that implements this outcome, but the equilibrium is not unique. If firms are vertically integrated a symmetric equilibrium implementing the monopoly outcome fails to exist if the number of VI firms is sufficiently large. In this case there are only asymmetric equilibria with an uneven distribution of profits. Thus, with horizontal integration it seems more likely that a welfare improvement will be implemented than under non-integration which in turn outperforms vertical integration.
Entry on the Downstream Market
What are the effects of vertical and horizontal integration on market entry and innovation? In this section we consider the cases of entry on the same downstream market and of entry on a separate market that also requires the upstream goods as essential inputs. 
Entry on the same downstream market:

Entry on a separate downstream market:
Consider now the case of an independent company that comes up with an idea to use the upstream patents for a new product that is sold on a new separate market where this firm is a monopolist. Suppose that the monopoly profit that the new firm can make on this market is with ( ) e r Π 0 e r ∂Π < ∂ , where denotes the total royalties to be paid upstream. However, in order to develop the new product and to enter the market the firm has to incur a sunk cost of . Suppose that is private information of the entrant. The suppliers of the essential inputs only know that is drawn from Proof: See Appendix.
The reason is that the vertically integrated or non-integrated upstream firms suffer from the complements problem. However, Proposition 9 assumes that upstream firms cannot commit ex ante to the royalties they will charge after entry occurs and that they are restricted to use linear royalties. What happens if these assumptions are relaxed?
With two-part tariffs all upstream firms will set the linear part of the royalty equal to zero.
Recall that there is only one downstream firm on the new market, so linear royalties of zero will induce the monopoly outcome and the monopoly profit . In addition, each upstream firm will charge a fixed fee in order to extract as much of the monopoly profit as (0) e Π possible. The problem is that upstream firms do not know the entry costs K of the entrant. If the sum of all fixed royalties is larger than K, the entrant will not enter.
If all upstream firms are horizontally integrated, the horizontally integrated firm will charge a fixed fee that maximizes (8) ( ( 0 ) ) ) ( ( 0 ) 
Proposition 10: Suppose that upstream firms can use two-part tariffs and can commit to their royalties before market entry occurs. Given Assumption 3 there exists a unique pure strategy equilibrium for any number of upstream firms. The total fixed fee is lowest and the probability of entry is largest if all upstream firms are horizontally integrated. The larger the number of independent upstream firms, the larger is the total fixed royalty and the smaller is the probability of entry.
Thus, Proposition 10 confirms the result of Proposition 9 that a horizontally integrated upstream firm (or a patent pool) facilitates entry as compared to a market with several vertically integrated (or non-integrated) firms.
Innovation on the Upstream Market
What are the implications of different market structures on the incentives to innovate and to come up with new technologies on the upstream market? Suppose that a company has an idea for an innovation that improves the quality of the technology. This may be an additional feature that makes it possible to use the technology for new applications, to reduce the cost to employ the technology in downstream production or to raise the benefits of consumers from using the downstream product. Innovation can be interpreted as entry on the upstream market.
However, while the entrant on the downstream market produces a substitute to the products of the other downstream firms, the entrant on the upstream market produces a complement to the other upstream goods.
To develop the innovation and to protect it by a patent the innovator has to incur an investment cost . The innovation can be used only if the existing upstream firms include it in the standard. The innovation raises consumers' willingness to pay and/or lowers production costs. This raises the profits that can be made on upstream and downstream markets. By how much profits increase depends on the market structure. The analysis of the preceding sections suggests that if linear royalties have to be used additional profits will be higher under horizontal integration than under non-integration. It will also be higher under horizontal integration than under vertical integration if the number of downstream producers is sufficiently large. In this section we do not model explicitly how different market structures affect the profits that can be derived from the innovation. Instead we assume that if the innovative patent is owned by a horizontally integrated firm the profits of this firm will increase from to . If however, there are m independent upstream firms initially, and if the number of independent upstream firms increases to 0 I > Π Π+Δ 1 m + because the innovation is included in the standard then total upstream profits change from to . By Propositions 5 and 6 we know that total royalties are increasing with and that for all total royalties are higher than the royalty a monopolist would choose.
Therefore we must have and Suppose now that the potential innovator is a new company that does not own any other patents that are essential to the standard. Furthermore, the company has to develop the innovation and to incur the (sunk) investment cost I before negotiating on the terms of including the innovation in the standard.
If the standard is controlled by a horizontally integrated company the analysis is straightforward. If the two parties will agree that the horizontally integrated firm buys the innovation and includes it in the standard. Assuming Nash bargaining they will split the surplus equally, so the innovator receives 0 Δ> 2 Δ . Thus, the investment in the innovation will be undertaken if and only if 2 I Δ < .
Consider now the case with independent upstream firms. It does not matter whether these firms are vertically integrated or not. In principle, there are two ways how the innovation can be included in the standard. First, the innovator could join the standard as an independent firm, so the number of upstream firms increases to If these conditions are not satisfied, the innovation could still be included in the standard if one of upstream firms acquires the patent. If it does so, the innovation raises total profits from to . Thus, the profit of the firm that acquired the patent increases by
− , where is the price to be paid to the innovator. Assuming Nash bargaining,
. Thus, the investment will be undertaken only if () 2
however, that this is an asymmetric equilibrium and that the profits of all other firms increase by () m m Δ because they benefit from the innovation without having to pay for it. Thus, there is a free rider problem where each firm prefers the other firms to acquire the patent. It turns out that there does not exist a symmetric equilibrium with a positive probability of innovation. A symmetric equilibrium would have to be a mixed strategy equilibrium where each firm acquires the patent with positive probability. However, in a mixed strategy equilibrium each firm has to be indifferent between acquiring and not acquiring. Thus, the surplus to be shared with the innovator is zero. But if the price for the innovation is zero, the innovation will not be undertaken.
These results are summarized in the following proposition: 
Note that (1) is equivalent to the assumption that each firm's marginal revenue is declining in the aggregate output of all other firms, i.e.
where . Proof: Novshek (1985) shows that Condition 1 implies the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in the Cournot game. To see that the equilibrium is unique, note that given Condition 1 each firm's profit function is globally concave, so equilibrium quantities are characterized by first order conditions (1) we have . Therefore, we must have as well which is equivalent to (2).
. Comparing the FOCs for in the two equilibria and using the fact that we have . Summing up over all d this implies . However, Dixit (1986, p. 120) 
Using the implicit function theorem we get that is continuously differentiable with ( Qc
The strict inequality is implied by Condition 1.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: Assumption 2 implies that the profit function of each upstream firm is globally concave in , Consider now asymmetric pure strategy equilibria. Suppose that only one firm serves the downstream market. In equilibrium this firm must make zero profits. Otherwise the other firms would have an incentive to raise the fixed fees of their royalties. With a monopolist downstream profits are maximized if all upstream firms charge linear royalties of zero and fixed fees equal to the monopoly profit divided by n-1. Given these royalties, no firm has an incentive to deviate, so this is indeed a subgame perfect pure strategy equilibrium. In this equilibrium the monopolist serving the downstream market makes zero profits, while all the other firms share the monopoly profit.
Proof of Proposition 9: By Proposition 5 we know that total royalties increase as the number of independent upstream suppliers increases. Thus, total royalties are larger under nonintegration or vertical integration than under horizontal integration while is smaller.
The probability that entry occurs is ( ) e r Π ) 1 ( ( ) ) 1 ( 
